One gate to the world: Shorashim and Gitea behind the shared ingress

Three NLBs became one (185.19.28.170, ingress-nginx).

Shorashim: `shorashim-external` (NLB 185.19.29.180, NodePort 30923)
is replaced by an Ingress — a host-less catch-all (works by IP, no DNS)
plus a `shorashim.ch` rule ready for the A record; TLS deliberately not
requested until the name resolves. Sanhedrin-length proxy timeouts.

The watch behind the ingress (completes tablet 46): the TCP peer is now
the ingress controller, so Mishmar.peer/1 takes the caller from
X-Real-IP — only when the peer is inside TRUSTED_PROXIES (the pod
network, configmap); from anyone else the header is the caller's own
claim and is ignored. The ingress Service was already
externalTrafficPolicy: Local with its health-check port open, so the
caller's address arrives without the security-group change the direct
route needed. Verified live: the 11th knock is 429, a forged X-Real-IP
is still 429, and in the same minute the old route (pod sees the node)
was a different subject.

Gitea: no name of its resolves, so it rides the controller's TCP
passthrough on the same NLB — :3000 → gitea:80, :22 → gitea:22
(ingress-tcp-services.yaml), on the two NodePorts the security group
already allowed. gitea-mcp now reaches Gitea over the cluster network
instead of out through an NLB and back.

Tamid §1.1 note, KOHEN.md, AGENTS.md. Doorpost e4e3d56d… → a2ec3842….
Elixir 539/0 (L3 on and off).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

specs/shorashim_tamid.md

@@ -48,8 +48,10 @@ Rate limit: 10 requests per minute per IP
            No identification stored. IP is used for rate-limiting only,
            not logged beyond the current request.
            429 carries Retry-After and the manna explanation.
-           (The Service must deliver the caller's address to the pod —
-           externalTrafficPolicy: Local — or every caller is one IP.)
+           (The caller's address reaches the pod through the ingress:
+           the controller's Service is externalTrafficPolicy: Local and
+           it writes X-Real-IP, believed only from the pod network.
+           Without both, every caller is one IP.)
 ```
 
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