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bikoret/deploy/k8s/secrets.yaml
T
Scott KarpandClaude Fable 5.1 354e223384 housekeeping: the inventory a stranger reads first
From a reading of the gate's documents (2026-10-21):
- AGENTS.md: Steps 14 and 15 shown Pending while the Port and both
  sockets have carried live traffic since the gate was built → Done,
  with what carries them; "next build task" now points at the open
  items, the phase tables being complete.
- README.md: the repository tree omitted azazel_processor,
  kushya_generator, mesorah, src/tools and scripts → listed, each in a
  line.
- deploy/ARCHITECTURE.md: the judgment path holds no model, said in
  writing — the examination is Python patterns and Prolog rules, the
  judges consult that Prolog; kushya_generator (a fine-tuned model in
  this repo, not deployed, not wired) is an OFFERER whose output is
  examined, never a component the bedikah, the engine or a judge
  consults. The kohen is not the offerer. azazel_processor listed.
- The map: the repository is public; eleven files named the ingress
  NLB's literal address and five the kohen's kubeconfig path. Docs now
  use the domains (git.bikoret.ch, bikoret.ch) or "<NLB-IP>" with the
  kubectl query that answers it; the kubeconfig is "$KUBECONFIG" /
  "$HOME/.kube/<your-cluster>.yaml". gitea-public-apply.sh takes NLB
  from the environment. None of it was a secret; all of it was a map.
- OTP pin: checked, not changed — the segfault in the build log was a
  source-built OTP 26.2.1 on macOS; the image is hexpm's 26.2.1 with
  ERL_FLAGS +JMsingle.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-21 18:32:35 +00:00

126 lines
4.9 KiB
YAML

# Bikoret Secrets — template only
# NEVER commit actual secret values to git.
# Apply with: kubectl apply -f - after filling in values.
#
# The DATABASE_URL connects to Exoscale PostgreSQL (temple-council-db)
# in ch-gva-2 zone. Retrieve credentials from:
# exo dbaas show temple-council-db --zone ch-gva-2
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: shorashim-secrets
namespace: shorashim
type: Opaque
stringData:
# PostgreSQL connection for L3 Oral Tradition — the APPLICATION role.
# Format: ecto://user:password@host:port/database?sslmode=require
# This is shorashim_app: INSERT and SELECT on the L3 tables, no DDL,
# no CREATE on schema public. Append-only is enforced by the grants,
# not by the application's good behaviour.
DATABASE_URL: "REPLACE_WITH_ACTUAL_DATABASE_URL"
---
# ============================================================
# shorashim-migrate-secrets — the DDL role
# ============================================================
#
# KOHEN.md:184 — "the migration runs as avnadmin; the application runs
# as shorashim_app." TWO ROLES, TWO SECRETS. Only the `migrate` init
# container reads this one (deployment.yaml overrides DATABASE_URL for
# that container alone); every app container keeps shorashim-secrets
# above.
#
# WHY IT IS SEPARATE AND NOT JUST A GRANT: Ecto.Migrator.run/3 calls
# ensure_schema_migrations_table! BEFORE checking what is pending, so
# it issues CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS schema_migrations on EVERY pod
# start, even with migrations current. As shorashim_app that is
# ERROR 42501 permission denied for schema public, and the pod never
# reaches Running. The alternative — granting shorashim_app CREATE on
# schema public — collapses the app/migration boundary the runbook
# draws deliberately. Do not take it.
#
# THIS FILE IS A TEMPLATE. Never commit a real value. Create the secret
# from the live database credential instead:
#
# export KUBECONFIG="$HOME/.kube/<your-cluster>.yaml"
# umask 077
# TMP=$(mktemp)
#
# exo dbaas user reveal-secrets temple-council-db avnadmin \
# --zone ch-gva-2 -O json \
# | python3 -c '
# import base64, json, subprocess, sys, urllib.parse
# avn = json.load(sys.stdin)["password"]
# app = subprocess.run(
# ["kubectl", "get", "secret", "shorashim-secrets", "-n", "bikoret",
# "-o", "jsonpath={.data.DATABASE_URL}"],
# capture_output=True, text=True, check=True).stdout
# u = urllib.parse.urlsplit(base64.b64decode(app).decode())
# pw = urllib.parse.quote(avn, safe="")
# netloc = "avnadmin:%s@%s:%d" % (pw, u.hostname, u.port)
# sys.stdout.write(
# urllib.parse.urlunsplit((u.scheme, netloc, u.path, u.query, u.fragment)))
# ' > "$TMP"
#
# kubectl create secret generic shorashim-migrate-secrets \
# --namespace shorashim --from-file=DATABASE_URL="$TMP"
#
# rm -f "$TMP"
#
# The rewrite is done in Python, not with `sed s|...|...|`, on purpose.
# A generated password containing & or | or \ corrupts a sed
# replacement silently — & re-inserts the matched text and | ends the
# expression early — and the result is a DATABASE_URL that looks
# plausible and does not authenticate. quote(safe="") also percent-
# encodes any character that is not URL-safe in the userinfo field,
# which sed would have passed through raw. The value goes via a
# umask-077 temp file rather than --from-literal so the password is
# never an argv entry visible to `ps`.
#
# Absence is meant to be loud: without this secret the pod stops at
# CreateContainerConfigError. There is no fallback to the app role.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: shorashim-migrate-secrets
namespace: shorashim
type: Opaque
stringData:
# ecto://avnadmin:PASSWORD@host:port/database?sslmode=require
DATABASE_URL: "REPLACE_WITH_AVNADMIN_DATABASE_URL"
---
# ============================================================
# shorashim-api-keys — who may enter the courtyard
# ============================================================
#
# Mounted as the file /etc/bikoret/secrets/api_keys in vav-pipeline
# (Construction §4.6: a secret is a file). One key per line:
#
# courtyard <key> offerings and bedikot (/courtyard/*)
# chatzer <key> also the Sanhedrin (/chatzer/*); opens the courtyard too
#
# Issue a key (KOHEN.md "Issuing a key"):
#
# umask 077; TMP=$(mktemp)
# printf 'courtyard %s\n' "$(openssl rand -hex 32)" >> "$TMP"
# kubectl create secret generic shorashim-api-keys -n shorashim \
# --from-file=api_keys="$TMP"
# # rotate: kubectl create ... --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f -
# rm -f "$TMP"
#
# The kubelet refreshes a projected Secret within about a minute; the
# gate reads the file on every request, so a rotated key takes effect
# without a rollout. No file, no keys → nobody passes (GATE_NO_KEYS in
# the log).
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: shorashim-api-keys
namespace: shorashim
type: Opaque
stringData:
api_keys: |
# tier key
courtyard REPLACE_WITH_openssl_rand_hex_32